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 Meaning Making in Motion: 
Bodies and Minds Moving through Institutional and Semiotic 
Structures 
 
What is meaning? And how does it arise? Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) approach to 
symbol formation was prescient in understanding the importance of the body and 
activity. However, their embodied approach needs to be complemented by a broader 
conceptualization of social institutions and complex semiotic structures in the genesis 
and function of symbolic processes. Specifically, human bodies, which are the medium 
and locus of experience, are embedded in social situations and institutions. Thus 
embodied experience, the origin of meaning, must be understood as societally 
structured. Moreover, human experience is never unmediated, it is refracted through the 
complex semiotic artifacts that comprise human culture, such as discourses, social 
representations and symbolic resources. The present article focuses on the importance 
of bodies moving within institutions and minds moving within semiotic structures as a 
basis for meaning making. We argue that such movement has been neglected, yet, it 
has the potential to enhance our understanding of how experiences are differentiated 
and integrated within individuals to produce individuals who are products of society and 
who also have agency in relation to society. 
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What is meaning? And how does it arise? Werner and Kaplan (1963) chose to tackle 
these fundamental questions through informed theoretical discussion and a series of 
patient and original empirical studies. Their findings were prescient, demonstrating the 
grounding of symbolic representation in the human activity, specifically the body and its 
sense organs. They also insisted that symbol formation is a fundamentally social 
process, however, the social dimension was underdeveloped. 
 
In the present article we build on Werner and Kaplan’s conception of symbol formation, 
elaborating the underdeveloped social aspect. The article begins with an outline of 
Werner and Kaplan’s basic theory, highlighting the focus on embodiment as a main 
strength, and advancing the critique that their conception of ‘the social’ is relatively thin. 
The conceptualization of the social which we introduce stands in marked contrast to the 
usual emphasis on ‘the other’ and social interaction. In contrast, we emphasize first 
social structures (both institutions and semiotic artifacts) and then show how the 
movement of bodies and minds within such social structures catalyzes meaning making. 
 
An Organismic-Developmental Approach to Symbol Formation 
 
Werner and Kaplan (1963, p. iii) had the commendable aim of creating an “organismic-
developmental” approach to language and “the expression of thought.” The term 
“organismic” indicates a holistic and somewhat functional approach grounded in the 
body and practice of organisms. The term “developmental” indicates that any 
understanding of symbol formation needs to be grounded in the ontogenetic 
development of the organism. Their approach is clearly different from behaviourist 
accounts of ‘verbal behaviour’ (e.g., Skinner, 1957; Ogden & Richards, 1930) which, 
they argue (p. 13-14), reduce meaning (i.e., symbols) to mere “signs” or “signals” in the 
environment which trigger a response1. Their approach is also clearly different from 
theories which search for the origins of meaning in cognitive universals (e.g., Chomsky, 
1995), because their approach emphasizes the active organism in a social world (Glick, 
2013). Their organismic approach is aligned with the work of von Uexküll (1992), being 
holistic as opposed to reductionist (Marková, 1982), and accordingly is paradigmatically 
aligned with the work of Vygotsky and Luria (1994/1932) and Mead (1922). 
 
Numerous diverse and highly original empirical studies lead Werner and Kaplan (1963, 
p. 41) to a model of symbol formation that has four components: the addressor (or the 
symbolizer), the addressee (or the audience), the referent being symbolized and the 
symbol vehicle (see Müller, Yeung & Hutchison, 2013). These four components are, in 
                                                          
1
 There is a lot of terminological confusion around the terms symbol, sign, signal and cue. Our understanding is 
that there is a broad equivalence between that what Werner and Kaplan (1963) term ‘symbol,’ what Mead (1922; 
Gillespie, 2005) termed ‘significant symbol’ and what Vygotsky and Luria (1994/1932) termed ‘sign’ (see Wagoner, 
2010). In each case these terms are used to refer to a higher-order form of meaning and representation. Cues and 
signals (and, for Mead, non-significant symbols), on the other hand, generally refer to the non-intended triggers in 
the environment (Saleh, Scott, Bryning & Chittka, 2007; Gillespie, 2010a). 
 
the experience of the child, initially fused and un-differentiated. Symbol formation is the 
gradual differentiation and integration of these four components, such that the 
addressor becomes able to use the symbol vehicle to represent the referent for the 
addressee. In this model, the meaning of a symbol between an addressee as an 
addressor does not need to be “the same,” but rather, “the only requirement is that the 
connotations evoked in both addressor and addressee occupy a comparable position 
within each person’s network of meaning” (1963, p. 50). 
 
Werner and Kaplan (1963) were ahead of their time in recognising the embodied nature 
of meaning. While James, Dewey, and Mead (and to a lesser extent Vygotsky) had 
made general claims about the link between meaning and action (i.e., the meaning of a 
bicycle is to ride it), they had not backed these claims up with research. Werner and 
Kaplan (1963), on the other hand, provide detailed evidence of the way in which our 
senses, experiences, and even mood are constitutive of meaning, even complex 
conceptual meaning. For example, they report research by Krauss who asked 45 
people to draw linear patterns for 18 words referring to moods, colours, natural 
happenings, actions, etc. The participants drew “expressive” motives – for instance a 
long line for “longing” and a curly line for “gay” (p. 340). One of participant states, about 
their line for “gay,” that it “is a leaping, bounding, joyousness; that’s also the case for the 
line – leaps and then a bound” (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, p. 339). Thus they illustrate 
how there is a deep embodied, even visceral, aspect to meaning which is maintained 
across modalities. In this way their work has foreshadowed the more recent work on 
embodied metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Cornejo, Olivares & Rojas, 2013), 
gesture (McNeill, 2000; Levy & McNeill, 2013), activity (Miettinen, Paavola & Pohjola, 
2012) and habitus (Lizardo, in press).  
 
Leaving aside the obvious strength of Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) model for addressing 
the embodied aspects of meaning, let us focus on its weaker aspect, namely the social 
aspect. How does the social operate within their model? Their model, we suggest, is 
social in three ways: First, symbols are oriented to an addressee, being used to 
communicate with the addressee. Second, for symbols to be communicative the 
addressee and addressor need to partially share a field of normative meanings. Third, 
children learn symbols from others, imitating them at first, and only later becoming 
autonomous users of symbols. Thus the social is primarily in the form of another person 
(the addressee) who is the target of communication, has a partially shared conception of 
what symbols mean, and from whom people learn what symbols mean. Thus even 
when Werner and Kaplan (1963, p. 361) consider complex meanings, such as 
“modesty,” which subjects relate to being “nun-like,” or familiar lines such as “the lady 
doth protest too much,” there is a tendency to underplay the broader cultural context 
(but see Werner, 1957). 
 
The aim of the present article is to augment Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) 
conceptualization with a more fleshed out understanding of the role of social institutions 
(and people’s trajectories through them) and more complex trans-individual meaning 
structures (such as discourses, representations, or symbolic resources) in meaning 
making. The following two sections elaborate on these two omissions in turn. 
  
Bodies Moving Within Social Institutions 
 
Werner and Kaplan’s (1963, p. 41) model of symbol formation, specifically their 
addressee-addressor-symbol-referent rhombus, is depicted outside of any context (i.e., 
situation, context, institution or society). The model ‘hangs’ in unspecified ether. Where 
is this symbol use occurring? Who are the actors? What were their previous 
experiences? What institutional structures are shaping the interaction? What are the 
partially agreed norms and expectations? That these considerations are largely absent 
is not particularly important from Werner and Kaplan’s standpoint, because their 
conceptualization of meaning begins with individual expression, and grows outward, 
towards social relationships and society. But this omission becomes significant if one 
gives the social a more constitutive role in symbol formation. 
 
According to Mead (1922), meaning begins with the actions of one organism having 
consequences for a second organism, such that the action of the first organism ‘creates 
an impression’ on the second organism. For example, the first organism might prepare 
an attack, and the second organism flees. The sight of the preparation to attack is a 
visual cue which comes to mean ‘time to flee’ for the second organism (but it means 
nothing to the first organism). The developmental breakthrough is for the first organism 
to realize that its action is a cue, at which point, the action becomes symbolic (or 
significantly symbolic) in the sense that the first organism can use the action to cause 
the second organism to run away. This account of symbol formation, crucially, begins 
not with a ‘will to express’ but rather with ‘unintended impressions.’ It is the response of 
the second organism, the addressee, which constitutes the meaning of the symbol for 
the addressor. Interestingly, Werner and Kaplan (1963, p. 16) come close to recognizing 
this when they write: “a gesture directly and unintentionally expressing an emotion such 
as joy or disgust is not symbolic; the so-called ‘symbolism’ of gestural and postural 
patterns may be symbolic for the interpreter, but they are not for the producing 
individual.” However, Werner and Kaplan do not elaborate this point, failing to see it as 
an opening to a more profoundly social conception of meaning making. 
 
If one accepts that symbolic meaning begins with unintended impressions, then the 
question becomes: How does a young infant become aware of the communicative 
significance of their own actions? First, we need a conception of social institutions, that 
is, a cultural-historical pattern of interaction, with differentiated social positions (each 
with role-expectations, and maybe also rights and responsibilities). Second, there needs 
to be bodies moving between these social positions, such that infants can cultivate and 
internalize both the unintended communicative activity and the communicative 
significance of that activity. 
 
Let us take Werner and Kaplan’s (1963, p. 41) addressor and addressee and situate 
them in a socio-historical pattern of interaction, such as, a family unit. Imagine parents 
and two children, an infant girl and a 4 year-old boy. The infant is crying. The father, 
mother, and boy strive to comfort the infant with food, cuddles and attention. The family 
is enacting a small but widespread social practice. The crying infant does not know the 
impression that its’ crying creates. At most the infant begins to associate crying with 
food and comfort, and those positive outcomes may even reinforce the crying – but this 
is not sufficient to make the crying symbolic (in Werner & Kaplan’s sense or significant 
symbolic in Mead’s sense) for the infant. The infant does not ‘intend’ to ‘mean’ anything 
by crying. But, now let us turn to the 4 year-old boy. The boy participates in trying to 
feed and comfort the distressed infant. The boy is socialized into the social position of 
caring, and internalizes those practices and meanings. The boy learns to recognize the 
infant’s crying as calling-out a care-giving response. This gets interesting when we 
expand our analysis beyond the isolated situation. Later it will be the boy who cries, and 
when he does, his cries have both internality and externality. He cries like the infant, but 
also responds to his own cries like the parents because he has internalized their care-
giving response through his own actions towards the infant. Quite likely these care-
giving responses have also been rehearsed through play with dolls and in the narrative 
structure of stories and books. In short, he begins to know the meaning for crying. He 
can intentionally ‘use’ crying, for example, he might induce his own crying so as to 
obtain the caring response. Thus the crying becomes meaningful. The four elements in 
Werner and Kaplan’s model (the crying, the care-giving response, the crier and the 
responder) have become differentiated and integrated into a higher-level semantic 
structure. 
 
Gillespie (2005) and Martin and Gillespie (2010) have argued that the key mechanism 
which turns an action, such as crying, into a symbol is ‘position exchange.’ The non-
intentional expression of spontaneous crying becomes an intentional expression 
through the boy’s movement between social positions within a relatively stable 
institutional structure. The institution we are dealing with is the family, and specifically 
the micro-institution of caring. It is a culturally patterned joint activity, it is initiated by 
normatively accepted markers (such as crying), each party makes sense of the situation 
through resources such as role models, strategies, caring words, expected narratives 
and norms of response. The social positions are that of caregiver and care-receiver. 
These social positions are relatively stable, and the interaction repeats itself in similar, 
but never identical, ways. However, what does change is the social position that the 
participants occupy. The boy sometimes cries and sometimes responds to the crying of 
another (the infant or maybe even an adult). What becomes crucial is the boy’s 
trajectory, or movement, between the social positions within the relatively stable 
institution, or social architecture, of care-giving. It is this trajectory through both roles 
within the social activity of care-giving which enables the boy to internalize the entire 
activity, becoming aware of the meaning of many aspects of the activity from both 
perspectives within the activity.  
 
The emergence of meaning out of bodies moving between socially structured situations 
and roles also operates at the level of play. It is notable that children often role play the 
social positions that are of consequence for them, but which they don’t get to occupy in 
practice – such as playing at being a parent or teacher (Edwards, 2000). One contender 
for a universal in children’s play is the doll, and the doll is usually an infant. Arguably, 
children are using the infant doll as a cultural support to enable the child to explore the 
social position of being an adult. Playing which responds to the infant doll, the crying 
doll, the hungry doll, the sleeping doll, enables children to explore the meaning of their 
own actions from the standpoint of their parents. Equally, at the level of fiction and 
narrative, the same movements between social positions occur. For example, in the 
story Hansel and Gretel, Hansel, the elder brother, comforts Gretel in the forests when 
she is crying because they have been abandoned. To understand the relationship, one 
needs to understand both sides of the interaction, namely, Gretel’s urge to cry and 
Hansel’s desire to comfort her. The narrative structure is like an institution, it is a 
sociocultural scaffold supporting the meanings of both sides of the interaction. The next 
section focuses upon complex semiotic artifacts, like narratives, demonstrating again 
how movement within these structures feeds into meaning making. 
 
 
Minds Moving within Complex Semiotic Artifacts 
 
Analyzing the construction of meaning of symbols, Werner and Kaplan (1963) identify 
the genesis of the meaning of words, first in the child and later in the adult. Drawing on 
Bühler, they acknowledge that the meaning of symbols have to be understood as these 
belong to fields or systems of relations, which refer to the structure of a given language 
as a whole (Chapter 4). Then Werner and Kaplan explore how we elaborate the 
meaning of unknown concepts in the context of their uses in sentences (Chapter 13), 
and how we attribute expressive or emotional qualities to the sonorous qualities of 
words (Chapter 20). Across these empirical studies the unit of analysis is usually a 
single or compound word. It is only towards the end of their book that they consider 
more complex constructions, such as “he opens a bottle” (p. 385), “he catches a 
criminal” (p. 396), and “I am sad if I lose” (p. 460). Thus, although they emphasize the 
role of semantic fields in constructing meaning, their own empirical work tends to 
sidestep this issue. Meaning, we suggest, needs to be understood in relation to a 
semantic field for three reasons. 
 
First, all utterances have addressivity, they are replies to previous utterances and 
anticipations of forthcoming ones (Bakhtin, 1982, 1984, 1996). We can never escape 
the field of meanings. Consciousness flows, sometimes being externalized through one 
or the other semiotic mode, and one meaning only ever gives way to another meaning, 
like waves lapping one over the other from (James, 1890). The sentences we produce 
are just one very partial surface aspect of this flow, and as such, they are, again, both 
responses and anticipations, marked by the undertones of older meanings, awaking the 
echoes of others, and carrying the harmonics of previous contexts of use (Bakhtin, 
1982, 1996).  
 
Second, most of the ideas and cultural artifacts we encounter are not reducible to 
simple sentences. The social representation of new migrants, Die Hard III, a newspaper 
article, or Anna Karenina are each a holistic field of meaning. Such artifacts are made 
out of chains of sentences or fields of semiotic units. Others, like a prayer or a Legal 
article, take their meaning from their being part of a larger semiotic system (such as the 
legal system, or a religion). As consequence, we never deal with only one concept at 
the time. Most of the semiotic constructs we meet are complex, and understanding the 
whole is more than understanding each component in turn. For example, making sense 
of a movie is more than understanding the sum of the words used in the film. Werner 
and Kaplan’s (1963) study of people’s understanding of words in context suggest that 
meaning is part of a more general Gestalt, or as Valsiner (2007) would say, as part of a 
field-like meaning. Yet what interests the authors is more how, within that context, words 
participate in the elaboration or tonality of a sentence, which is demonstrated by 
experiences on word permutation (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, p. 455), not how the 
sentence itself contributes to making a narrative, a collective memory or an ideology. 
 
Finally, we are exposed to a multiplicity of complex cultural discourses, whether these 
are foregrounded or in the background (Lyotard, 1982). Consider browsing a newspaper 
or watching TV in between a family discussion and concerns about work issues. Simply 
walking down a street entails navigating not only other people, but also the diverse 
meanings of shop displays, advertisements, and political posters. How can such a 
cacophony of meanings be understood? With their focus on single words or sentences, 
isolated from the semiosphere, Werner and Kaplan (1963) do not give us tools to 
understand meaning making in real life contexts. Accordingly, we suggest that it is 
important to move beyond the laboratory, and to examine how symbols are encountered 
in everyday life. 
 
Taking account of the field of meanings leads us to focus upon how people, or 
specifically people’s minds, move within these fields of meaning. Movements within 
fields of meaning is, perhaps, most evident in narratives. In a narrative, the person is 
guided through various positions and experiences. For example, Miller, Hoogstra, Mintz, 
Fung and Williams (1993) show how Kurt (age 2) progressively appropriates the story of 
Peter the Rabbit by asking his parents to narrate it again and again, and regularly 
producing his own renditions. In his first re-telling, Kurt only mentioned one aspect of 
the story (a little rabbit is punished for eating forbidden vegetables). Later, he added 
more aspects (the angry gardener and the rabbit’s appetite). Finally, he mastered the 
complexity of the narrative (a “naughty” rabbit who disobeys its mother, might be 
punished, but will still be loved by her). What does it mean to understand the narrative? 
It entails being able to take the perspective of the hungry rabbit Peter, of the angry 
gardener, and the worried mother. Each perspective has different emotions, and the 
narrative arises out of the holistic interaction of these perspectives. As Kurt understands 
the narrative, so he increasingly understands the word ‘naughty,’ with its normative, 
conditional, and transient aspects. Kurt, like Peter the Rabbit, has enjoyed playing in a 
garden, and like him he has felt hungry and angry, and maybe even worried. These 
experiences, acquired in Kurt’s trajectory through the social world, are now recombined, 
with the narrative providing a new trajectory through these experiences, in the 
production of a largely novel experience.  
 
Cultural artifacts, such as books, films or even ideas and arguments, are multimodal 
(combining sound, image, words, etc.) semiotic structures which guide experience, 
creating trajectories of meaning. These artifacts, just like the institutions discussed in 
the preceding section, have an architecture which canalizes and guides experiences 
along particular routes and trajectories. A film imposes a succession of moving images, 
kinetic impressions, and sounds. A painting guides the gaze of the viewer with faces, 
eye gazes, contrasts, and surprising elements (Berger, 1972, p. 26). In his psychology 
of art, Vygotsky (1971) analyzed the structure of literary or musical works to show how 
the organization of the characters, the progression of the plot, the rhythm of the 
unfolding events, etc., were actually guiding specific psychological and emotional 
responses. Thus “art is the social technique of emotion” (Vygotsky, 1971, p. 249) which 
“organizes future behavior” (Vygotsky, 1971, p. 253). Moving beyond art, teaching 
materials, advertisements, and political discourses are also complex semiotic structures 
which canalize trajectories of meaning. Using available techniques (rhetoric, research 
on colours, shapes, or sounds) for awakening specific embodied reaction, these 
semiotic structures guide people through ideas, images, representations or values, 
whether these are about the past, about alternative lives, or possible futures.  
 
All cultural artifacts engage the personal memories and experiences of their users, 
mobilizing and reorganizing these in the creation of new meaning. In this sense, the 
meaning produced by cultural artifacts is not simply ‘derivative’ of the everyday 
meanings which people have accumulated in their trajectories through institutional and 
social world. These cultural artifacts create new meanings and trajectories, which 
themselves leave traces, becoming open to reconfiguration in future cultural 
experiences, and also transforming people’s daily experiences of the social and 
institutional world (Zittoun, 2006). In other words, many layers and echoes of symbols 
and their meanings are residues of people’s exploration of the complex semiotic 
architectures offered by our cultural environment. The more we travel through semiotic 
architectures, the richer these meanings can become, as these are both anchored in 
personal experiences, and in the vast universe of cultural values, narratives, and human 
accumulated experience. Thus, despite drawing upon embodied and personal 
meanings originating in the social and institutional world, so-called fictional experiences 
can transform our direct experience of the social and institutional world. For example, 
tourists experience the Himalayas through narratives and films, with this field of fiction 
broadening the horizons of what tourists can experience (Gillespie, 2007). 
 
 
Bodies and Minds in Movement: Differentiating and Integrating 
Experiences 
 
Bodies are the locus and medium of experience, but bodies are not floating mid-air, 
specifically human bodies are firmly situated within institutional practices and complex 
webs of cultural meaning which are often tacit (Turner, 2012). But, most importantly, we 
are emphasizing that bodies move through socially structured experiences, and, in a 
likewise manner, human minds move through experiences shaped by complex cultural 
artifacts. Such movement, we now argue, might underlie the differentiation and 
integration of experience.  
 
Central to Werner and Kaplan’s (1963, p. 7) conceptualization is “the orthogenetic 
principle,” namely, the tendency of organisms to move from a state of relative globality 
and undifferentiatedness towards states of increasing differentiation and hierarchic 
integration.” This orthogenetic principle underlies the progressive differentiation of the 
four components (addressor, addressee, symbol vehicle and referent) of their model of 
symbol formation, with the increased integration creating the interrelationships which 
allow for intentional symbolic processes (see Müller, Yeung & Hutchison, 2013). 
However, despite the descriptive insight of this principle, the mechanism accounting for 
this process of differentiation and integration remains under specified. What drives the 
orthogenetic principle? 
 
We want to suggest that it is movement which drives this differentiation and integration. 
Specifically, bodies and minds moving through institutional and semiotic worlds (1) 
accumulate differentiated experiences and (2) have these experiences integrated, or 
linked, one to the other, through the guided sequencing of those differentiated 
experiences. This operates both at the level of bodies moving through the social world 
and minds moving through fictional, or entirely semiotic, worlds. 
 
Moving within institutional structures differentiates experience: people get a chance to 
be care-giver and care-receiver, to be buyer and seller, to be child and parent and so 
on. Each new social position we take up constitutes a differentiated domain of 
experience. But the movement between these social positions might also help to 
integrate them, weaving together these otherwise disconnected domains of experience, 
such that the integration forms an intersubjective structure, enabling people to 
participate in differentiated but integrated perspectives within a social activity. The 
meaning of ‘caring’ is both care-giving and care-receiving, the meaning of ‘buying’ is 
both buying and selling, and so on (Gillespie, 2010a). Bodies, with their rudimentary and 
embodied memory, moving between inter-related social positions within institutional 
structures are like threaded needles, stitching together the domains of experience into a 
integrated and meaningful and thus intersubjective whole. 
 
Moving within semiotic structures, such as worlds of fiction or political discourses, also 
differentiates and integrates experience. A narrative is not a single action or experience, 
nor is it simply a sequence of actions or events as seen from one persons’ point of view. 
A narrative entails interacting points of view, and a structured sequence of events. The 
stream of consciousness (James, 1890) channelled through a narrative not only has a 
sequence of experiences cultivated, but, also, usually participates in a play of 
perspectives and experiences. Narratives have characters with differentiated interests, 
knowledge, values and emotions. To understand a narrative is to participate in this 
multiplicity of interacting experiences. For example, to understand a Japanese movie is 
to both participate in what the various protagonists feel, and also, to grasp the narrative 
structure they are part in. In addition, it is to feel moved by the colours and the shapes 
of the décor, transported by the melody of the music, or the rhythm of the words and 
actions (Zittoun, 2013). These differentiated experiences (embodied, emotional, linked 
to identification and reflection) are, here again, recombined and woven together in new 
ways from the start of the film to the end in the production of a new experience. 
 
Symbols arise at the points where internal, personal, embodied and emotional 
experiences meet an external social or semiotic structure. Meaning is were personal 
sense and shared meaning meet. The personal sense comes from our own unique 
embodied trajectories. Although our experiences are socially determined, that 
determination works on our own individual bodies, stirring individual emotions, creating 
personal sense. This personal sense finds expression, or resonance, in social settings 
and semiotic structures. Equally, these institutional setting and semiotic structures need 
to find the relevant personal sense, the relevant past experiences and embodied 
memories, in their participants to function.  
 
We embark daily into multiple worlds (Schütz, 1945), moving through the institutions of 
family routine, to public transport, to daydreaming, to employment, to alternatives 
imagined in conversation, to emailing and maybe ending the day with a trip to the 
theatre or movies. This clash and play of situations and semiotic realms leads to a 
conceptualization of human experience as complex, multi-layered, reflective, partially 
integrated, and unresolved. Indeed, it is the incomplete integration, the disjunctions and 
tensions, which propel human meaning forward, just like the unresolved elements in a 
narrative keep the audience engaged. 
 
 
Conclusion: Meaning Making in Motion 
 
Theory and research which emphasizes ‘the social’ in human development and 
meaning making has tended to focus upon ‘the other.’ Questions concern social 
interaction and the role of significant others in scaffolding the emergence of meaning. 
The present article has pointed to a different route for the social construction of 
meaning, namely social institutions and complex semiotic artifacts. Specifically, our 
focus has been on bodies and minds moving within institutions and cultural artifacts. 
Thus we build upon Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) conceptualization of meaning as 
embodied, but expand upon this by putting the body in motion. Bodies move within 
society, accumulating societally patterned experiences, which in turn provide the 
resources for cultural and fictional experiences. These cultural and fictional experiences 
are also characterized by movement, the movement of the mind between differentiated 
experiences, and the narrative structure, just like the structure of an institution, also 
provides the mechanism for integrating these experiences and perspectives into a 
meaningful whole.  
 
The importance of movement is most evident at the ideographic level of human life 
trajectories. Social psychologists have often been criticized for neglecting context 
(Jovchelovitch, 2007) and now it is common to emphasize the importance of context 
(Howarth et al., in press), however, people don’t live in just one context (Dreier 2009), 
rather, they move between contexts (both social and fictional). Such movement between 
domains, we argue, is crucial to meaning making.  
 
Consider the trajectory of Malcolm X, which passed through a wide range of social 
positions. He was successful at school, became a gangster, was a prisoner, and 
became a religious minister in the Nation of Islam. Malcolm X’s peculiar variant of 
international human rights activism only becomes intelligible against this background. 
He combined meanings from school, the street, and religion into a unique and powerful 
complex of meanings (Gillespie, 2005, 2010b). Similarly, young Turkish adolescents 
moving between the contexts of British school and Turkish home, internalize the 
tensions of multicultural London producing novel and creative syntheses (Aveling & 
Gillespie, 2008). Or consider the case of June, a young woman living in England during 
World War II. During the course of the war she moved from the periphery to increasing 
involvement. Analysis of her diaries reveal how she accumulates experiences from 
diverse institutions (a local community, summer classes at University, life in the farm), 
relationships (family members, instructors and boyfriends) and fictional experiences 
(including propaganda and Walt Disney movies), and how she combines these to make 
her own reaction to events (Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling & Zittoun, 2008; Zittoun, Cornish, 
Gillespie & Aveling, 2008). At the end of the war, these multiplicities of representations 
and positions, themselves in dialogue with new possibilities opened up by fiction and 
new political programs, allowed her define her own original synthesis (Zittoun, Aveling, 
Gillespie & Cornish, 2012). What is crucial in all these analyses of trajectories is how 
movement into a new experience in a situated or fictional domain provides a new 
vantage point on previous experiences, identities, and commitments. Distanciation from 
everyday life begins, not with a psychological feat of reflection, but with the more 
mundane and explicable act of moving into a new experience (whether structured by 
institutions or complex semiotic artifacts). 
  
The fact that humans can move is both elementary and profoundly constitutive. It 
problematizes any opposition between self and other (because self can become other; 
Gillespie, Howarth & Cornish, 2012) and it enables us to reconceptualize the relation 
between individuals and society (Akram, 2013). Individuals experience society in a 
personal way (Zittoun, 2006), internalizing it, as they move through it. Societally 
structured experiences, facilitated by institutions and cultural artifacts, progressively 
lead to an embodied internalization of society. The body is not only the locus and 
medium of experience; it is also the means for society to reproduce itself. Physical and 
semantic architectures channel and guide experience, leading us from one experience 
to the next, and scaffolding both of differentiation and integration of these experiences. 
Does this put too much emphasis on societal determination? Where is personal 
meaning and agency? How does agency emerge of this societal and cultural 
orchestration of experience? 
 
Agency arises not because individuals are less determined by society, but rather 
because they are over-determined. Life trajectories move people from one social 
context to another, from one cultural experience to another, from one discourse to 
another, and in so doing, people accumulate heterogeneous discourses, norms, 
artifacts and symbolic resources. A person’s trajectory through society and associated 
accumulation creates an internal semiotic landscape that mirrors (from the perspective 
of the individual) the overlapping and dissonant semiotic structures of society. It is the 
overlap, the tensions, and contradictions between these internalizations which create 
agency, and the space for reflective thought (Zittoun, 2012). Thus, we maintain, 
beginning with the elementary movement of bodies in a social world we can step-up to 
the complexity of psychological movements within semiotic realms, and eventually the 
dynamics of distanciation which enable human agency. 
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